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abstract:	
A book chapter (about 4,000 words, plus references) on decision theory in moral 
philosophy, with particular attention to uses of decision theory in specifying the 
contents of moral principles (e.g., expected-value forms of act and rule 
utilitarianism), uses of decision theory in arguing in support of moral principles 
(e.g., the hypothetical-choice arguments of Harsanyi and Rawls), and attempts to 
derive morality from rationality (e.g., the views of Gauthier and McClennen). 
*	*	*	
Decision theory is important in the history of moral philosophy, and it is 
important in an unusual way. Many theories in the history of moral philosophy, such 
as utilitarianism and Kant’s moral theory, are not only parts of that history but are 
also stand-alone moral theories in their own right. In fact, it is their prominence and 
influence as distinct moral theories that make them important parts of the history of 
moral philosophy. In contrast, decision theory is not a distinct moral theory. Instead, 
it is important in the history of moral philosophy in a different way: as a source of 
concepts and principles that play crucial roles in certain important moral theories. 
In short, although decision theory itself is not among the discrete parts of the 
history of moral philosophy, some of its elements are integral to several theories 
that are. 
                                                        
* I would like to thank Donald Bruckner, Dale Miller, Martin Peterson, and Ned McClennen for their 
comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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Before focusing on those elements specifically, it will be useful to briefly 
survey decision theory more generally. Decision theory is a field of thought that 
consists not of a single theory, but of many theories; it is a broad and variegated 
field, with its constituent theories having little in common other than being 
concerned with decision-making. But certain organizing distinctions are commonly 
made. One is the familiar descriptive/prescriptive distinction: some theories 
attempt to explain certain systematically or anecdotally observed patterns of 
decision-making, while other theories propose normative criteria for decision-
making, such as principles for making certain kinds of decisions rationally. Another 
organizing distinction, independent of the descriptive/prescriptive one, hinges on 
the maker of the decision: there are theories that focus on the decisions of a single 
person, theories that focus on the decisions of several interacting people (as in game 
theory), and theories that focus on the decisions of groups constituted by multiple 
people (as in social choice theory). As discussed below, the elements of decision 
theory that are integral to major moral theories come mostly from prescriptive 
approaches to individual decision-making. 
Given the breadth of the field of decision theory and the variety of the kinds 
of decision-making that fall within its ambit, one might wonder whether it claims 
moral theories as constituent theories as well. After all, most moral theories often 
focus on decision-making and the prescriptive half of decision theory would seem to 
accommodate them easily. The reality, however, is that moral philosophy is typically 
seen as separate from, rather than a department of, decision theory. Canonically 
moral concepts and principles such as fairness, justice, individual rights, and the 
golden rule are largely absent from decision theory (though some parts of social 
choice theory do attempt to address them). Instead, decision theory usually takes 
the pursuit of individual self-interest or well-being as its starting point; and even 
when it does not, it is principally concerned with non-moral aspects of decision-
making, such as when and how a person’s preferences can be represented in a 
mathematically convenient structure, how complex choices can sometimes be 
reduced to simpler ones, and what risks it is rational to take. The mostly non-moral 
character of decision theory is manifested in the elements of decision theory 
discussed in this chapter. 
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The organization of this chapter reflects the fact that elements of decision 
theory have been used in two main ways in the history of moral philosophy (or the 
history of ethics – different terms are, of course, used by different authors). First, 
moral theorists have drawn on elements of decision theory in order to more fully 
specify the contents of their moral principles. That is, they have drawn on elements 
of decision theory in order to articulate their principles of moral rightness and 
moral wrongness more explicitly, or to provide something like an algorithm that an 
agent can follow in order to act morally (by the lights of their theories) in a 
particular decision situation. Second, moral theorists have drawn on elements of 
decision theory in order to argue in support of their moral principles. In most cases, 
decision-theoretic reasoning has been used in combination with moral reasoning, 
but in some cases, decision-theoretic reasoning has been claimed to entail, by itself, 
substantive moral principles.1 
Specifying	the	Contents	of	Moral	Principles	
Moral theorists, as a group, have diverse aims and priorities in articulating 
their theories. Most of them, however, take the specification of a principle of 
rightness and wrongness to be a central task in their endeavors, and in this task 
most of them strive to make that principle highly determinate – i.e., providing 
specific guidance concerning how an agent should act in a large range of cases. Some 
moral theorists, especially consequentialist ones, find elements of decision theory to 
be helpful for this purpose. 
Probably the most influential such element is the idea of expected utility. 
This is used primarily in the specification of consequentialist principles – in 
particular, in response to the fact that it is usually impossible for an agent to predict 
all of the consequences of all of her possible actions. For an illustration of how 
expected-utility theory can be used in such cases, suppose that there is an outbreak 
of a disease that a public-health doctor can treat with either a conventional 
                                                        
1 The plan of this chapter is but one of many possible ways of discussing decision theory and 
moral philosophy. For other approaches, see Dreier 2004 and the articles in Ethical	Theory	and	Moral	
Practice	vol. 13, no. 5 (November 2010), a special issue titled “Rational Choice and Ethics”: Lumer 
2010a, Narveson 2010, McClennen 2010, Verbeek 2010, Lumer 2010b, and Hansson 2010. 
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antibiotic or an experimental antibiotic. It is known that the conventional antibiotic 
will result in partial eradication, and that the experimental antibiotic will result in 
either complete eradication or no change at all. Which option is better? 
Expected-utility theory provides a way of answering this question, if two 
kinds of quantitative information can be established. First, probabilities need to be 
assigned to the possible outcomes. Given the description of the situation just 
provided, the conventional antibiotic obviously has a 100-percent probability of 
resulting in partial eradication. And let us also suppose that the experimental 
antibiotic has a 30-percent probability of resulting in complete eradication and a 70-
percent probability of resulting in no change. 
Second, the possible outcomes need to be assigned utilities that reflect their 
relative goodness. Obviously complete eradication is better than partial eradication, 
and partial eradication is better than no change. So, there is a goodness difference 
between the first outcome and the second, and a goodness difference between the 
second and the third. Expected-utility theory requires a comparison of the 
magnitudes of those goodness differences. So, let us suppose that complete 
eradication would be better than partial eradication three	times	as	much	as partial 
eradication would be better than no change. Then we can say that complete 
eradication, partial eradication, and no change have utilities of 5, 2, and 1. (Many 
other values, such as 27, 21, and 19, would work equally well. The absolute 
magnitudes do not matter; only the relative magnitudes of the gaps between the 
numbers matter.) 
Given these pieces of quantitative information, expected-utility theory 
provides a way of ascertaining which option is better. The two options’ expected 
utilities are to be computed, and the option with the higher expected utility is better. 
An option’s expected utility is defined as the weighted average of the utilities of its 
possible outcomes, where the weights are the probabilities of the occurrences of the 
possible outcomes. Since the conventional antibiotic has a 100-percent probability 
of resulting in an outcome having a utility of 2, its expected utility is easy to 
compute: 
100 percent × 2 = 2 
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And since the experimental antibiotic has a 30-percent probability of resulting in an 
outcome having a utility of 5 and a 70-percent probability of resulting in an outcome 
having a utility of 1, its expected utility can be computed as follows: 
(30 percent × 5) + (70 percent × 1) = 1.5 + 0.7 = 2.2 
Because the experimental antibiotic has the higher expected utility, it is the better 
option. 
This sort of reasoning is invoked in several ways in the specification of 
consequentialist principles. J.J.C. Smart, articulating an act-utilitarian theory, writes 
that although expected-utility considerations do not affect whether an act is right 
(for that still depends on the act’s actual consequences), having maximal expected 
utility is enough to make an act rational.2 Some theorists, however, go farther, and 
make rightness itself depend on expected utility (or expected value, where value is 
understood to be broader than utility, as consequentialism is broader than 
utilitarianism). The best-known advocate of this maneuver is Frank Jackson, who 
formulates a “decision-theoretic consequentialism.”3 
Acts are not the only things whose effects interest consequentialists. Some 
consequentialists focus on the effects of various rules, motives, character traits, or 
institutions, and here, too, expected-utility reasoning provides a way of coping with 
unpredictability. For example, Brad Hooker begins his rule-consequentialist book by 
asking, “Shouldn’t we try to live by the moral code whose communal acceptance 
would, as far as we can tell, have the best consequences?”4 Because of the difficulty 
of identifying that code, Hooker writes that moral codes should be compared not in 
terms of the actual consequences of their communal acceptance, but in terms of the 
expected values of their communal acceptance. 
                                                        
2 Smart 1961: 33–4. This material reappears in Smart 1973: 46–7. A similar position is 
suggested in Lyons 1965: 26–7. 
3 Jackson 1991: 463–4 (though the phrase “decision-theoretic consequentialism” is from the 
title of the article). 
4 Hooker 2000: 1. All of the material from Hooker discussed in this paragraph is in Hooker 
2000: 1–2, but also see Hooker 2000: 72–5. 
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We have seen how one element of decision theory – the idea of expected 
utility – is employed in the specification of the contents of moral principles. 
Although this is the element that is most illuminating to consider at length, other 
elements are also employed. For example, Smart suggests turning to decision theory 
for techniques for the assignment of probabilities to possible outcomes5 and for 
deciding whether to comply with an onerous but generally beneficial rule.6 Michael 
Slote suggests formulating act consequentialism as requiring only that the agent 
perform an act that is good	enough rather than the best one – using the economist 
Herbert Simon’s idea of “satisficing.”7 And there is an extensive literature debating 
the coherence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being.8 In many ways, then, 
elements of decision theory are used in the specification of the contents of moral 
principles. 
Arguing	in	Support	of	Moral	Principles	
The other frequent use of elements of decision theory in moral philosophy is 
in the formulation of arguments in support of moral principles. Important examples 
of this kind of work are found not only in consequentialist theories, but in Kantian 
and Hobbesian ones as well. 
Smart’s	Maximization	Argument	
One argument in support of act utilitarianism is the simple idea that if it is 
rational for one person to maximize his or her personal well-being, then it is equally 
justifiable, in the moral realm, for overall well-being to be maximized. This is true, 
according to this argument, even if maximizing overall well-being requires actions 
that decrease, rather than increase, certain persons’ well-being. Smart makes this 
argument in the following passage: 
if it is rational for me to choose the pain of a visit to the dentist in 
order to prevent the pain of toothache, why is it not rational of me to 
                                                        
5 Smart 1961: 28–9; and Smart 1973: 40–1. 
6 Smart 1956: 351–2; Smart 1961: 43–4; and Smart 1973: 57–60. See also Gauthier 1965 . 
7 The seminal works on this topic are Slote 1984 and Pettit 1984. See also Byron 2004. 
8 See, for example, Elster and Roemer 1991. 
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choose a pain for Jones, similar to that of my visit to the dentist, if that 
is the only way in which I can prevent a pain, equal to that of my 
toothache, for Robinson?9 
Smart offers this argument in response to a claim that John Rawls presents in his 
1958 article “Justice as Fairness,”10 and Rawls criticizes it in his A	Theory	of	Justice 
(1971): 
This view of social cooperation [i.e., act utilitarianism] is the 
consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one 
man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons 
into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic 
spectator. Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction 
between persons.11 
This remains one of the most well-known objections to act utilitarianism, and its 
merits continue to be debated.12 
Harsanyi’s	Hypothetical‐Choice	Argument	
Another argument in support of act utilitarianism, one developed in the work 
of John C. Harsanyi, proceeds as follows.13 If it would be rational for the people of 
                                                        
9 Smart 1961: 26; and Smart 1973: 37. 
10 Rawls 1958. 
11 Rawls 1971: 27. 
12 Probing discussions include Brink 1993 and Zwolinski 2008. 
13 This paragraph and the succeeding one are based on Harsanyi 1953; Harsanyi 1977: 48–
51; and Harsanyi 1982: 44–8. 
Harsanyi also formulated highly technical axiomatic arguments in support of act 
utilitarianism. See Harsanyi 1955; and Harsanyi 1977: 64–81. Although this approach attracted 
considerable attention from other decision theorists in the ensuing decades, it had a much smaller 
influence on the work of moral theorists. Harsanyi himself writes that it “yields a lesser amount of 
philosophically interesting information about the nature of morality” than the approach discussed in 
the text (Harsanyi 1982: 48). John Broome evaluates it more favorably; see Broome 1991: 58. For an 
overview and critical assessment of it, see Roemer 1996: 138–47. But for a largely favorable moral- 
theoretic reception, see Risse 2002.     (footnote	continued	on	next	page) 
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some society to unanimously prefer that social decisions be made in accordance 
with a certain moral principle, then that fact would make that moral principle 
justified. (This is, of course, the intuition at the root of the social-contract tradition 
in moral and political philosophy.) Unfortunately, given the fact that persons’ 
different positions in society cause it to be rational for them to have divergent 
preferences, it seems hopeless to argue in favor of any moral principle in this way. 
But there are variations on this approach that might be fruitful. For example, if it 
would be rational for the people in some hypothetical choice situation to 
unanimously prefer that social decisions be made in accordance with a certain 
moral principle, and that hypothetical choice situation had moral force (despite 
being hypothetical), then that fact would also make that moral principle justified.14 
Now (the argument continues), imagine a choice situation populated by 
people who are ignorant of their positions in society, so that each person must think 
impartially about how he or she would prefer for social decisions to be made. Surely 
this choice situation has moral force, despite being hypothetical; in fact, it gains its 
moral force from the very alteration that makes it hypothetical. Now, what would it 
be rational for the people in this choice situation to prefer? To answer this question, 
the argument invokes decision-theoretic reasoning. It claims that it would be 
rational for each person (1) to assume that he or she stood an equal probability of 
occupying each of the positions occupied by the people of that society, (2) to deduce 
that his or her expected utility would be maximized if social decisions were made in 
accordance with act utilitarianism, and (3) to prefer that social decisions be made in 
that way. Because of the moral force of the given choice situation (so the argument 
concludes), this preference entails that act utilitarianism is justified. 
                                                        
Despite formulating these pioneering arguments in support of act utilitarianism, Harsanyi 
actually turned out to be a longtime advocate of rule utilitarianism, which he supported using 
decision-theoretic and other arguments. For what might be Harsanyi’s last published work on this 
topic, see Harsanyi 1998. 
14 A classic discussion of the general approach of invoking hypothetical situations in moral 
reasoning is Broad 1916. 
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Although this argument has been criticized,15 its basic strategy is ingenious. 
It starts with the obviously moral question of which moral principle is justified, and 
then argues that we would have an answer to this question if we could answer the 
non-moral question of what it would be rational for people in a certain choice 
situation to prefer. Finally, it invokes decision-theoretic reasoning to answer that 
non-moral question. In effect, it engages in just enough moral reasoning – the design 
of the choice situation – to enable the rest of the work to be done by non-moral 
reasoning. And the role of decision theory, of course, is to provide that non-moral 
reasoning. 
Rawls’s	Hypothetical‐Choice	Argument	
A similar argument is used by Rawls, in support of his Kantian theory of 
justice. Rawls follows Harsanyi in imagining a choice situation populated by people 
who are ignorant of their positions in society, so that each person must think 
impartially about how he or she would prefer for social decisions to be made. 
(Rawls calls his choice situation “the original position” and famously characterizes 
the persons’ lack of information with the evocative metaphor of the “veil of 
ignorance.”)16 Then, in order to answer the question of what it would be rational for 
the people in this choice situation to prefer, Rawls again follows Harsanyi in 
drawing on a choice rule of decision theory. However, he departs from Harsanyi’s 
path by denying that it would be rational for the people to employ the rule of 
maximizing expected utility. Instead, Rawls argues, it would be rational for the 
people to employ the maximin rule – the rule of choosing an option whose worst 
possible outcome is at least as good as the worst possible outcome of every other 
option. (As suggested by the name, the idea is to maximize the minimum. All of the 
options are compared solely in terms of their worst, or minimum, possible outcomes 
– their other possible outcomes do not matter.)17 Rawls points out that if the people 
employ this rule, then they will reject the prospect of social decisions being made in 
accordance with act utilitarianism, since such a regime might cause the worst-off 
                                                        
15 For a recent and accessible critique, see Roemer 2008. 
16 Rawls 1971: 136–42. 
17 Rawls 1971: 154–5. 
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people in society to be worse off than it is necessary for the worst-off people to be. 
(After all, maximizing overall well-being does not necessarily maximize the well-
being of the worst-off.)18 Instead, the kind of regime recommended by the maximin 
rule is one governed by Rawls’s conception of justice,19 in which concern for the 
well-being of the worst-off people in society is explicitly built into the governing 
principle: 
All social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to	the	advantage	of	
the	least	favored.20 
This is the “General Conception” of Rawls’s theory of justice. In essence, it is the 
maximin decision rule restated as a principle of moral and political philosophy. 
Rawls further argues that the people would reason that “the long-run tendency” of 
this principle would require two kinds of strict equality – equality of political 
liberties and fair equality of opportunity – and would allow inequality only in the 
distribution of social and economic goods.21 Consequently, the principles Rawls says 
the people would endorse are explicitly egalitarian in a way that the maximin rule is 
not. But the persons’ reasoning about what they would prefer is entirely guided by 
the maximin rule, not any moral or other independent commitment to equality. 
Rawls’s reliance on the maximin rule is generally seen as one of the more 
questionable parts of his theory. Rawls acknowledges that “Clearly the maximin rule 
is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices under uncertainty”22 but defends the 
maximin rule as suitable when three conditions are satisfied: the basis for 
probability estimates is weak, the option selected by the maximin rule will lead to 
an acceptable outcome, and the options selected by other rules might lead to 
                                                        
18 Rawls 1971: 156, 158, 160, and 170–1. 
19 Rawls 1971: 152–7. 
20 Rawls 1971: 303, emphasis added. 
21 Rawls 1971: 152. 
22 Rawls 1971: 153. 
11 
unacceptable outcomes.23 (And he claims that these conditions are satisfied in the 
present case.)24 Most moral theorists maintain that the general implausibility of the 
maximin rule (which Rawls acknowledges, as just mentioned) persists even when 
these conditions are satisfied, though some recent discussions of the maximin rule 
are more sympathetic.25 
Gauthier	and	McClennen:	Deriving	Morality	from	Rationality	
The last use of decision theory in moral philosophy to be considered here is 
found in the Hobbesian moral theory of David Gauthier and the closely aligned view 
of Edward F. McClennen.26 One of the perennial questions of ethics concerns the 
seemingly irresolvable conflict between self-interest and morality – often 
encapsulated in the question “Why be moral?” It is a commonplace of discussions of 
this question that a person’s interests are usually better served by complying with 
certain moral rules (such as rules requiring cooperation and the keeping of 
promises) than by breaking them. That is, it is usually rational to comply with 
certain moral rules. Gauthier and McClennen draw attention to the further, subtler 
truth that a person’s interests are usually well served if she has a disposition to 
comply with certain moral rules, even if that disposition is so strong that it causes 
her to comply with moral rules in cases in which, all things considered, she would be 
better off breaking those rules. That is, it is usually rational to be disposed to comply 
with certain moral rules. Now, the next step in the argument is the novel one, from a 
decision-theoretic point of view. It is, in essence, the assertion of the principle that if 
some action is required by rules that it is rational for a person to be disposed to 
comply with, then that action is rational (for that person) – even if it makes the 
                                                        
23 Rawls 1971: 154–5. 
24 Rawls 1971: 155–6. 
25 See Angner 2004 (which also provides a helpful overview of the previous debate over the 
maximin rule) and van Roojen 2008. 
26 For Gauthier, see Gauthier 1986: 182–7; Gauthier 1994: 701; and Gauthier 1998: 58, n. 5. 
For McClennen, see McClennen 1990: 157 and 209–13; and McClennen 1997: 231–3 and 241. 
Gauthier later revised his decision-theoretic views substantially; see Gauthier 2013: 606–9. The 
approach proposed there might, in time, turn out to be another important use of decision theory in 
moral philosophy. 
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person worse off, all things considered. Given the earlier claim that it is rational to 
be disposed to comply with certain moral rules, it follows that the actions required 
by those moral rules are also rational, from a decision-theoretic point of view. 
Two things are important to notice about this argument. First, the asserted 
decision-theoretic principle is highly unorthodox. Orthodox decision theory holds 
that an act is rational if and only if it maximally advances the person’s interests: an 
act “inherits” its rationality (for a person) from its outcome’s optimality (for a 
person). This is denied by the principle on which Gauthier and McClennen rely. That 
principle holds that an act inherits its rationality from the rationality of the rules 
that require it, and those rules inherit their rationality from the optimality of their 
outcomes. By analogy with the relationship between traditional (act) utilitarianism 
and rule utilitarianism, we can say that Gauthier’s and McClennen’s arguments 
aspire to nothing less than discrediting the traditional egoistic foundations of 
decision theory and re-founding the theory on the principle of rule egoism instead.27 
The second thing it is important to notice about this argument is its extreme 
ambition: it is a genuine instance of attempting to derive morality from rationality. 
In the arguments for moral theories reviewed previously (those of Smart, Harsanyi, 
and Rawls), the premises include substantive moral claims as well as non-moral 
claims (such as decision-theoretic claims). But the argument suggested by the work 
of Gauthier and McClennen has no substantive moral claims among its premises. 
Instead, the argument purports to show that rather than needing to appeal to moral 
considerations in order to vindicate moral rules, we can just appeal to decision-
theoretic rationality. Thus, the argument not only defends moral rules but also – and 
perhaps primarily – purports to give a deep and rigorous answer to the question 
“Why be moral?” It is thus one of the most ambitious uses of decision theory in the 
history of moral philosophy. 
                                                        
27 This unorthodox conception of rationality is, of course, controversial. See, for example, 
MacIntosh 1988; Uzan-Milofsky 2009; and the articles in the symposium on Gauthier’s Morals	by	
Agreement in Ethics vol. 123, no. 4 (July 2013): Morris 2013, Gauthier 2013, MacIntosh 2013, 
Bratman 2013, Finkelstein 2013, and van Donselaar 2013. 
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